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Abstract 
This essay provides an ordered review of all the criticisms to the marginalist  
theory of utility contained in The Political Element of Gunnar Myrdal. Firstly, 
Myrdal’s criticises the marginalist hypothesis on human behaviour (human 
beings are attracted by pleasure and repelled by pain), arguing that it is an 
interpretation which precedes observation, and seeks to demonstrate its 
groundlessness by drawing on advances in psychology. Also, in Myrdal’s 
opinion, the theory of value based on utility is affected by a circularity of 
reasoning and contains an untenable assumption on the continuity of 
psychological functions and on rationality. Myrdal, also because of these 
criticisms, developed a distinctive view of economic science close to that of 
classical economists, and anticipated the analytical risks that the discipline might 
incur if it failed to allow for the contributions of other social sciences.  
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1.1. Introduction 
In the announcement of the award of the 1974 Nobel Prize for economics 
to Gunnar Myrdal (together with von Hayek), the Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences mentioned three works: The Asian Drama (1968), 
An American Dilemma (1944), and The Political Element in the 
Development of Economic Theory (1930). This last work in particular 
was cited as a “pioneering critique of how political values in many areas 
of research are inserted into economic analyses”. The statement by the 
Nobel committee is indicative of the fate which has befallen Myrdal’s 
work, which is almost solely remembered for its contribution to the 
methodology of economic research. And yet the entire first part of 
Myrdal’s scientific output was taken up with theoretical issues (see 
Myrdal 1970, p.10), the close examination of which gave him solid 
grounds to argue his subsequent methodological positions. Almost 
entirely neglected of this part of Myrdal’s production is his critique of the 
neoclassical theory of value. This was a topic which, as noted by Palsson 
Syll (1998) in his excellent study, occupied the future Nobel prize-winner 
from his doctoral dissertation, The Problem of Price Formation and 
Economic Change (1927), until 1931, the year following publication in 
Sweden of the first edition of The Political Element1. This paper 
examines Myrdal’s critique of the utility-based theory of value set out in 
The Political Element. The critique, which takes up the whole chapter IV, 
is hard going for the contemporary reader, as for that matter is the entire 
book. Indeed, in one of the numerous reviews made of it when published 
in English,2 Ward wrote: 
 
Challenging though it is, the book is hampered by its style. 
The arrangement is not clear cut, the procedure is 
somewhat discursive, the treatment is needlessly involved. 
The “roundabout method of production” seems to have 
                                                 
1 The Political Element was published in German in 1932 and became known in the 
English-speaking countries only with the translation from the German by Paul Streeten in 
1953 (Harvard University Press), with a preface by Myrdal (1953). The edition cited here 
is the American one of 1990, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
2 Numerous authoritative economists reviewed the book, among them Hicks, Hutchison, 
Little, Machlup, and Ward. 
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been carried over into the writing of this book. (1955, pp. 
338-339). 
 
In regard to the chapter on the neoclassic theory of value, rather than 
following an orderly sequence of argument, Myrdal often indulges in 
digressions which, however learned and pertinent, distract the reader 
from the central thesis. Moreover, he does not conduct a monolithic 
critique but levels a diversified array of criticisms against the theory of 
utility, some of them fundamental and others of secondary importance. 
This paper will provide an orderly and reasoned presentation of these 
criticisms. It will also show that, although he did not develop a theory of 
economic choices alternative to the utility approach, Myrdal, who was 
nevertheless a competent mathematician, held a conception of economics 
antithetical to the almost contemporaneous one based on axiomatization. 
It is not historical punctiliousness which requires consideration of 
Myrdal’s critique of utility theory eighty years after its publication, but 
rather its unusual depth and topicality (and, as Myrdal complained about, 
unsurpassed currency3,) that, as has been pointed out, make it “relevant 
for those attempting a critical evaluation of conventional economic 
theory” (Velupillai 1992, p. 142). His critique not only centred on the 
postulate of  rationality as developed by the neoclassical tradition – and 
which found numerous elements of  currency in the behavioural 
economics approach – it also raised the problem of the relation between 
economics and the other social sciences, particularly psychology, which 
only many years later became of interest to economists with the 
enthusiastic work of Herbert Simon. What is perhaps of most interest to 
the economic historian is that, starting from the shortcomings of the 
neoclassical theory of value, The Political Element propounds a view of 
economics antithetical to that based on the assumption of the 
representative economic agent, which, besides its success in following 
years, was first codified in 1932 by Lionel Robbins. By resuming the 
classical view of economic phenomena, Myrdal  rejected the approach 
based on the hypothesis of homogeneous agents and asserted the 
importance of conflict of interests. The positions of relative advantage (or 
disadvantage) of the various groups in society reflect in non-uniform 
manner variations in the values of the economic variables, since price 
                                                 
3 Myrdal (1982, p. 275), quoted by Palsson Syll (1998, p. 419). 
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changes, interest rates, wages, etc., differently affect workers, 
entrepreneurs, savers, the unemployed, and so on. Myrdal trained the 
focus of economic science on maintaining a high degree of rationality in 
arguments concerning policy choices with consequences for the 
economic system, which he invariably regarded, not as isolated from the 
overall system of society but as standing in constant osmotic relationship 
with it. This was a view of economics faithful to its origins, when it was 
denominated ‘political economy’ (as Myrdal insisted on calling it 
throughout his lifetime) and substantially different from the science that 
related means and ends, as economics was famously defined by Robbins 
(1932). 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.1. first describes the origins 
of The Political Element and then examines Myrdal’s critique of the 
theory of utility. This criticism concerned a logical error in the economic 
reasoning of the utility theorists. This error was important because it 
helped him to disclose the presence of an ideological element in the 
development of economic theory. As will be seen, it was not considered 
decisive by Myrdal, who concentrated on other critical issues instead. In 
Section 3.1 the critique on the marginalist hypothesis on human 
behaviour (that human beings are attracted by pleasure and repelled by 
pain) is presented. This interpretation preceded the observation itself, in 
Myrdal’s opinion, and he sought to demonstrate its groundlessness by 
drawing on advances in psychology. The circularity of reasoning is 
presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3. considers Mydal’s discussion on the 
continuity of psychological functions and on rationality. It will then be 
argued in Section 4.1 that Myrdal, also because of the criticisms set out in 
chapter IV, developed a distinctive view of economic science which 
linked with those of the classical economists, and that he anticipated the 
analytical risks that the discipline might incur if it failed to account of the 
contributions of the other social sciences. Section 4.1 also reconstructs 
the philosophical influences which, according to Myrdal, had permeated 
economic categories of thought. Some concluding remarks are made in 
Section 5. 
2.1. The origins of The Political Element  
It was in order to dispute the theories of the previous generation of 
economists that Myrdal began, at the end of 1927, to write The Political 
Element. His intention was to show the ideological character of the 
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economic policy prescriptions that they embraced and sustained on the 
grounds of indisputable scientific superiority. To understand the genesis 
of what became a classic in the history of thought, some observations are 
in order. 
Firstly, to be borne in mind is the influence exerted on the young Myrdal, 
and on the whole of his generation, by the ideas of Axel Hagerstrom, a 
philosopher at the University of Uppsala, whose courses were attended by 
many students in the 1920s. From the lectures of this precursor of logical 
positivism, who opposed the then dominant idealism of conservative 
stamp, Myrdal acquired familiarity with the idea that there are no 
objective values which can be scientifically established and known. 
Rather, they must be considered only subjective valuations, which are of 
importance to science only as valuations by particular groups or 
individuals (see Myrdal 1930, p. 13; his afterword to Value in Social 
Theory; Velupillai 1992). Secondly, it should be remembered that the 
generation of economists that taught Myrdal powerfully influenced public 
opinion, as is customary in Sweden,4 and they argued in favour of an 
uncompromising laissez-faire (Myrdal 1953, p. xl) on the basis of 
‘scientific reasoning’.   
What was initially intended to be a pamphlet took shape as a scientific 
work, to which the young researcher devoted himself so closely that he 
gradually lost interest in the current political debate. The book took more 
than two years to write, and was completed in Washington D.C. on 31 
December 1929. Myrdal at that time embraced positions which he later 
recognized as naively positivist. He believed that it was only necessary to 
reconstruct the argument to detect its elements that were spurious 
(‘metaphysical’, as he termed them) with respect to the observed reality, 
to determine by logic the implications of every statement, and thus to 
confer objectivity on scientific reasoning. It was because of a personal 
crisis that prevented him from writing for the next two years that he 
achieved his belief of the following years, which underpinned his 
                                                 
4 One should bear in mind the particular social status of academic economists in Sweden, 
a country in which their reputation is such that they are consulted by the media for their 
opinions on the principal issues of political and economic debate, being preferred to other 
social scientists, philosophers, and former political leaders (see Carlson and Jonung, 2006, 
p. 512). Wicksell, Cassel, Hoeckscker, Ohlin and Myrdal himself, with their diverse 
political opinions, enjoyed unprecedented prestige in public opinion, whose formation 
they were persuaded was principally the responsibility of academics. 
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methodological position on the pervasiveness of values in the social 
sciences that required rigorous discipline of the researcher – with which 
he scrupulously abided throughout his lifetime – that at every step every 
ideological or political element must be denounced. In fact, every single 
aspect of social research (from faith in the value of the rational quest for 
knowledge, to the choice of the research object, the objectives and the 
analytical tools) can only be understood in terms of cultural meanings 
impossible to separate sharply from values. On this basis, Myrdal became 
convinced that every social problem can be studied from a variety of 
perspectives and that cumulative knowledge of the type proper to the 
natural sciences does not exist in the social sciences. 
2.2. The ‘logical critique’ of the utility-based theory of value  
The first of Myrdal’s criticisms was what we may call ‘logical’, and 
which, as said, he did not consider decisive in disproving the neoclassical 
theory of value.5 Though not decisive, it is presented here for its 
importance in the structure of The Political Element, whose intent was to 
reveal the presence of ideological and political elements in the theoretical 
apparatuses of economic science. It will be seen that it was the presence 
of logical errors in the economic reasoning that disclosed the presence of 
normative sentences to Myrdal. On the other hand, according to Eatwell 
(1974, p. 45), Myrdal’s criticisms of the logical consistency of the theory 
of value acquired great importance because it was through emphasis on 
the logical consistency of general economic equilibrium that the 
custodians of the orthodox approach preserved it against disastrous 
comparison with reality6.  
                                                 
5 In his autobiographical postscript to Value in Social Theory, Myrdal recognized that his 
decision to conduct a critical survey of economic theory might, from the psychological 
point of view, be considered as expressing his generation’s need to protest against the 
intellectual dominance of its masters. He also stated that he was attracted to the problem 
of value because he was aware that it constituted the weak point in economic theory. For 
an account of the state of the theory of value in Sweden when Myrdal was a young 
university lecturer see Palsson Syll, 1993. 
6Eatwell notes that also conducted on logical grounds was the critique by Sraffa (1960), 
the only one to have received widespread acknowledgement, although it is largely 
forgotten today. 
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Myrdal, in line with the Enlightenment tradition to which he wanted to 
belong,7 was convinced that the forms of economic speculation are not 
the aseptic ones of a science that looks to the natural sciences for its 
model. The way in which “we think in economic terms” pertains to the 
tradition of thought from which economics as a science originally sprang. 
The persistence of these categories in modern Western thought is a 
central theme in The Political Element: 
     
“The whole theory of economics, …, was an offshoot of 
philosophical speculation in France and England during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. …Economists clung 
too tenaciously to the philosophical foundation upon which 
their science had first been built…if the moral philosophy 
of utilitarians still survives in a fairly systematic shape, it 
owes this to the loving care with which it has been 
preserved in economic theory.” (Myrdal 1930, p. 17). 
 
And normative categories bred by that tradition of thought remained in 
the scientific discourse, disclosed by logical errors and self-evident 
terminology (Myrdal 1930, pp. 19 and 21). As a strenuous proponent of 
the force of  reason, Myrdal wanted to lay bare their presence, confident 
that this would suffice to purge the discipline of its errors.  
In the preface to the 1953 English translation, he declared that its purpose 
was: 
 
“to apply to them (economic doctrines) an immanent 
method of criticism and to lay bare the specific fallacies 
which, …, must be found somewhere between, on the one 
hand, statements of facts and theoretical analysis and, on 
the other hand, political conclusions (Myrdal 1953, p. xli).” 
 
 Palsson-Syll cites Myrdal’s definition of the method of immanent 
criticism. This he described as: 
                                                 
7 Sissela Bok (2005, p. xxiii-xxiv), second daughter of Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, 
remembers that her father was struck by the care with which the nineteenth-century 
authors chose the final word for their works. In this regard, he expressed his satisfaction at 
the choice of the closing sentence to An American Dilemma (1944):  
Yet we have in social science a greater trust in the improvability of man and society than 
we have ever had since the Enlightenment. 
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a satisfactory systemizing, from an inner point of view, of 
the view one studies, and from there to find out its 
assumptions and consequences. The point of the critique is 
to theoretically confront the different parts of the system, 
and thereafter, scrutinize one part from the view point of 
the other (Pallson-Syll 1998, p. 422 – Myrdal 1931, p. 
430). 
 
Myrdal opted for ‘conceptual analysis’, by which he meant the rigorous 
reconstruction of the logical chain in which each single proposition is 
linked to the next within the scientific discourse that starts from general 
statements based on observations of facts. From these it then formulates 
theoretical propositions which give rise to rational conclusions 
concerning policy. Myrdal was well aware that economic analysis is in 
itself merely a logical apparatus from which policy recommendations can 
only be derived if specific political assertions are introduced. He 
accordingly argued that it is logically impossible to deduce political 
conclusions from mere premises of facts. As Hutchison (1954, p. 346) 
noted, Myrdal’s close scrutiny of the language and postulates of 
economic theory was entirely consistent with the emphasis placed on the 
logical analysis of knowledge claims by Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle. Myrdal was convinced that 
 
the linguistic forms which the tradition offers to the 
economic theorist ensnares him at every turn in their old-
accepted associations. (1930, p. 19).  
 
And again: 
 
The perpetual hide-and-seek in economics consists in 
concealing the norm in the concept. It is thus imperative to 
eradicate not only the explicit principles but above all the 
valuations tacitly implied by the basic concepts. Being 
concealed, they are more insidious and elusive, and hence 
more likely to breed confusion. (1930 p. 192) 
 
On this basis Myrdal re-read the marginalist classics on the utility-based 
theory of value and divided them into two categories. A first set of 
authors he labelled ‘utilitarians’, giving extensive treatment to Jevons 
because of Jevons’ conscientious search for the philosophical precedents 
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of utilitarianism. The other set he termed ‘behaviourist’ and characterized 
it with an endeavour to separate the psychological problem from the 
economic one, which, in maintaining a subjective view of the theory of 
value, was identified with a problem of choice. Irving Fisher was chosen 
to represent the ‘behaviourists’ because of Fisher’s rejection of the 
Benthamite roots and his identification of utility with volition, and of 
volition with behaviour.  
This re-reading brought to Myrdal’s attention a systematic logical error 
committed by both groups of marginalists, of whom he expressly cited 
Jevons, Marshall, Pigou and Fisher. These declared on the one hand that 
the functions of individual utility cannot be compared, but on the other 
aggregated them or compared them.8 The error therefore consisted in 
claiming the impossibility of comparison but then overcoming that 
impossibility in practice. This, according to Myrdal, was the case of 
Jevons’ doctrine of the trading bodies: after having denied the logical 
possibility of comparing psychological quantities among individuals, 
Jevons then aggregated individual psychological functions to obtain 
social psychological functions. The difference between the following two 
operations is largely comprehensible: considering, for example, the 
participants in a market (or the inhabitants of a country, or a category of 
economic agents, etcetera) as consumers (or producers) of quantities of a 
certain good, or considering their utility (or disutility). The former is an 
operation that economists are certainly entitled to perform; but the latter 
is of an entirely different nature, which raises the conceptual problems 
that Myrdal investigated (1930, p. 101). 
Also Marshall, who had criticised Jevons on this point, and had sought to 
purge his approach of utilitarian residues, committed the same error 
when, on the unrealistic assumption of the constant utility of money 
(whose meaning, according to Myrdal, rested on the existence of an 
objective measure of value), he defined real costs in terms of disutility. 
Nor was Pigou’s theory of welfare economics – based on Marshall’s 
                                                 
8 Contrary to the evidence introduced here, literature has pointed out that incomparability 
was the terrain on which Myrdal confuted the utilitarian theses. For example, in his 
review of The Political Element, Little wrote as follows: 
In his detailed criticism of the doctrine, Myrdal sometimes seems to lose touch with the 
basic thesis he so brilliantly outlines in his first chapter. For instance, he dismisses 
utilitarian arguments mainly on the grounds of incomparability. (Little 1955, p. 231) 
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concept of  consumer surplus, which comprised the aforesaid logical error 
– with its notion of net social product immune to this contradiction either: 
 
Both authors admit, of course, difficulties and even 
impossibilities, but that does not prevent them from doing 
the impossible: it cannot be done, but here it is! (1930, p. 
101). 
 
The criticisms brought against the above authors also applied to the 
‘behaviourists’, even though they repudiated any connection with the old 
utilitarian tradition.9 
 
One might expect that the anti-hedonistic proponents of the 
positivist, behaviourist interpretation refrain from social 
value theories. But this is not true. (Myrdal 1930, p.103)   
     
Myrdal examined Irving Fisher’s position thoroughly “because his 
treatment is lucid, because he sees the implications of his premises and 
because he works out a practical method” (Myrdal 1930, p. 103). In 1927 
Fisher published an article on the statistical method for the measurement 
of marginal utility, his purpose being to test the justice of a progressive 
income tax. The article was subjected to harsh but acute criticism by 
Myrdal, who inveighed against the use of a certain rhetoric to disguise 
gaps in the theory. Myrdal also contended that Fisher paid the usual lip-
service by admitting that the measurement of psychological magnitudes 
like utility raised unresolved philosophical problems. After this admission 
however, Fisher objected that such problems are resolved by real people 
in their everyday lives, thus turning the argument on its head. Fisher 
                                                 
9 Myrdal also derived a comparability argument. Since individuals are able to order their 
preferences, they can evaluate whether a certain commodity is able to provide greater, 
smaller or equal pleasure compared with another. Although empirical data on utility 
amounts are not available, mathematical analysis is possible  
since comparisons are made only at the critical points where pleasures are virtually equal. 
The analysis is concerned with the neighbourhood of the margins, i.e. with positions near 
to equilibrium. (p. 91)  
The subjective marginal utility attached by an individual to a commodity can be indirectly 
measured by his/her willingness to pay for it. Myrdal insists that the argument “rests on 
the important assumption that the hedonistic interpretation of human behaviour is true.” 
(p. 92) 
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(1927, pp. 179-181) notes that even the most sceptical of philosophers, if 
unjustly taxed, would hardly feel appeased by knowing that any 
comparison between his fiscal burden and those of others was 
meaningless. Here Myrdal censures the use of a rhetoric which appeals to 
“our deep-rooted dislike of purely academic criticism” (Myrdal 1930, p. 
103) in order to shift the argument from the positive to the normative 
level. In fact, when we compare our utilities in everyday discourse –  as 
Myrdal claims that we all do – we compare on the basis of evaluations 
that reflect our subjective points of view. This is what is called exercising 
the capacity for moral judgment, which remains such even when its 
exercise is founded upon a wise and adequate understanding of the facts. 
The ambiguity with which moral judgments are presented as facts derived 
from the official statistics is highly improper. Also regarded as a 
convenient escape route from epistemological problems is Fisher’s 
argument that economists cannot afford to be too academic and evade 
problems which involve unsolved and perhaps insoluble philosophical 
questions (Fisher 1927, p. 180; see Myrdal 1930, note 23 to chapter IV, p. 
232). 
In conclusion to this examination of the ‘logical critique’, it is worth 
recalling two criticisms brought against Myrdal’s theoretical work: those 
by Blaug (1980) and Eatwell (1974). We start from Blaug’s criticism, 
whose profundity does not reach the usual standard of this author’s 
analyses. The point at issue is contained in his Methodology of 
Economics and is not directed against the logical critique but against the 
methodological approach of Myrdal. And one may wonder why it is to be 
considered in this paper. The reason is that Blaug denies Myrdal’s 
intellectual endeavour, which resulted in his conceptual reconstruction, 
through the immanent method, of the language inherited by economists. 
In actual fact, Blaug denies the existence of that kind of work in which 
results the logical critique, as it has been examined so far. He accuses 
Myrdal of introducing into economics an indiscriminate relativism which 
ascribes every economic statement to the personal value-choices of the 
economist, without examining – and this is the point of Blaug’s argument 
which is difficult to share - at which stage of the theoretical reasoning 
value-judgments are inserted: 
 
to declare the ubiquity and inevitability of value 
judgements, without examining precisely how and at what 
point they enter a piece of economic reasoning, is well 
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calculated to usher in a style of relativism in which all 
economic opinions are simply a matter of personal choice. 
(Blaug 1980, p. 121). 
 
However much one may disagree with Myrdal’s methodological position 
on the objectivity of social research, one must acknowledge the value of 
his conceptual reconstruction. In other words, Myrdal cannot be reproved 
for failing to examine when and where value judgments are inserted into 
the economic reasoning, for this was exactly what he did in writing The 
Political Element – to which, with his predilection for self-citation,10 he 
frequently referred the reader in his subsequent methodological writings. 
With reference to the topic of this paper, the logical critique proves the 
meticulousness with which the future Nobel prize-winner devoted 
himself to preventing the shifts of discourse whereby value judgements 
overlap with positive statements. 
More articulated and reasoned is the position taken up by Eatwell. Whilst 
acknowledging the value of Myrdal’s analysis, Eatwell pointed out a 
weakness in it: a sort of arbitrariness of critical perspective whereby 
every statement on value prejudices was made so relativist that anyone 
could ignore the critical thrust of Myrdal’s thesis if they so wanted: 
  
The reason for Myrdal's comparative failure [the 
comparison is with Sraffa’s logical critique] is to be found 
in an insidious circularity in his position, which enables 
those who find his views unpalatable to ignore them. The 
circularity arises from the presence of moral biases in the 
selection of techniques for the selection of bias. This is the 
fundamental deficiency of pragmatism and a belief in 
‘honest research (Myrdal 1974, p. 146) is not enough to 
break the circle. The weakness stems from a failure to 
propose any analysis of the origins of ‘bias’. (Eatwell 1974, 
p. 45). 
 
Eatwell (1974, pp. 45-46) instead maintained a position which the 
contemporary reader may find quite odd and even outdated. He affirmed 
that Myrdal’s critical perspective should be anchored in analysis of the 
historical genesis of the social conflict within which theories are 
developed. According to Eatwell, every theory arises from a social 
                                                 
10 P. Streeten (1992, p. 118) comments on Myrdal’s propensity to cite his own writings. 
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conflict between forces that desire change and have an interest in 
clarifying the real nature of a problem and others averse to social change, 
which they instead want to obstruct. Only subsequently do theories 
acquire independence from the practical case that has given origin to 
them. A theory which has received its original support from a particular 
policy measure loses contact with that measure and instead acquires 
‘scientificity’. Eatwell advocated an approach based on analysis of the 
genesis of the theory in social conflict, and he blamed its neglect on the 
randomness and maliciousness which seemingly characterized the 
ideological prejudices expressed by Myrdal.  
The ‘logical critique’ occupies Myrdal’s attention throughout chapter IV, 
on page 89 of which he begins a long digression which lasts until page 
100 (and which the reader wanting to follow “the main thread of the 
argument” is invited to skip). Further criticisms are put forward in these 
eleven pages. One of them is what Myrdal saw as the decisive argument. 
He reasoned that utility theory could withstand the objections of the 
‘logical critique’ if it could show that the notion of utility was a suitable 
representation of the motive for human choices. As will be seen in the 
next section, it was on this ground that Myrdal intended to launch his 
decisive assault on utility theory. 
3.1. Other criticisms of utility theory: the untenable hypothesis 
on human behaviour 
Before the advent of the thermometer, although quantitative measurement 
did not exist, it was possible to make comparisons, however approximate, 
between the different temperatures of two bodies. The absence of a 
measuring device, in Myrdal’s opinion, was irrelevant to the theoretical 
problem of formulating the laws of thermodynamics. Likewise the fact 
that there is no objective measure of utility, which makes every 
interpersonal comparison meaningless, would be irrelevant if utility 
theory were an accurate explanation of human behaviour.  
 
For a criticism of subjective value theory it is not sufficient 
to say that hedonistic quantities are not measurable. They 
are measurable if we grant the psychological premises, 
since these premises already imply measurability. It can 
hardly be denied that the subjective theory of value is true 
if hedonistic psychology is true. (1930, p. 92)  
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And shortly thereafter: 
 
We cannot dismiss the subjective theory of value simply by 
saying that it cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. It can 
if the hedonistic explanation of human behaviour is correct. 
(...) The question is whether the claim of marginal utility 
theory to be an accurate explanation of human behaviour is 
justified. (1930, p. 97). 
 
It was therefore in light of the capacity of utility theory to explain the 
mechanism of economic choices that, according to Myrdal, the theory 
must be appraised. To assess the plausibility of its explanation of human 
behaviour, Myrdal examines the versions of utility theory put forward by 
both the ‘utilitarians’ and the ‘behaviourists’. He deduces, much more 
explicitly in the former than the latter case, that both are based on a 
manifestly wrong interpretation: namely that the behaviour of individuals 
is driven by aversion to pain and attraction to pleasure. Myrdal cites 
advances in psychology to determine the veracity of this explanation of 
economic choices and, at the beginning of chapter IV (which also gives a 
brief history of the theory of value), he writes: 
 
marginal utility theory attempted to give a hedonistic 
interpretation of value at a time when psychologists were 
abandoning hedonism in favour of a more realistic 
analysis.(…) (This) indicates clearly the lack of contact 
between economics and psychology.  (p. 81) 
 
Myrdal then explains that the Benthamite idea that the people are driven 
in their actions by pain/pleasure is a psychological interpretation that 
precedes observations, also frequent among the classical authors, on the 
price/consumption relation.11 However, when compared with 
developments in psychology, this interpretation was clearly inadequate: at 
                                                 
11 Note that Myrdal also received his training as an economist under Gustav Cassel, who 
strongly opposed the subjective elements of the neoclassical theory of value and 
advocated a return to the theories of Cournot. However, Myrdal also criticised Cassel for 
unconscious adherence to the explanatory paradigm of utility. He respected Cassel 
profoundly despite the difference in their political positions. Cassel was a liberal 
conservative and a convinced proponent of the superiority of  free market policies, while 
Myrdal was a member of the Social Democratic Party and was sceptical of the concept of 
market equilibrium on theoretical and economic policy grounds. 
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the time when Myrdal was writing, psychologists had already realized 
that the problem of explaining human behaviour did not reside in the 
rationalist intellectualizations furnished by individuals. 
Psychologists were well aware that the object to be investigated was 
exactly the rationalizing explanations that human beings furnish for their 
behaviours. The instruments which they used were, on the one hand, 
those of experimental psychology, and on the other those of analytical 
introspection. Utilitarianism for its part also surrendered on the 
philosophical front when Sidgwick admitted that every attempt to found 
ethics on utilitarian bases had failed (Myrdal 1930, pp. 81-82).  
Myrdal made great efforts to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
explanations put forward by the ‘utilitarians’. His insistence may seem 
superfluous, given that the marginalists themselves soon started to 
eschew recourse to psychology in explanation of value. But Myrdal was 
convinced that the psychological content had remained intact and 
attacked on that point the utility theorists. He wanted to show that the 
efforts of the subsequent ‘behaviourists’ had produced nothing other than 
a subjective theory of value devoid of psychological content. Marshall, 
Bohm-Bawerk, Pareto and Fisher are the authors that Myrdal mentions to 
stress that shift. These authors had realized with embarrassment that the 
young science of economics had founded the theory of economic choices 
on a discredited and antiquated current of thought. To recover from their 
embarrassment they had purged economic terminology of every 
utilitarian reference, but without altering the underlying interpretative 
basis. Thus, Myrdal wrote, it was Marshall’s “professed rejection of 
hedonism” (p. 98) which had prompted him to replace, in the last edition 
of Principles, the word ‘pleasure’ with ‘satisfaction’ without changing 
the substance of his theory: 
  
He felt that hedonism was no longer quite up to date and 
could not resist paying lip service to the current fashion. 
(Myrdal 1930, p. 99).  
 
According to Myrdal, the new ‘behaviourists’ were even more easily 
confuted than the old ‘utilitarians’. It should be pointed out, however, that 
in this case Myrdal does not show his usual lucidity, because this further 
analysis – which examines only actors’ choices without being concerned 
to investigate their motivation – is equivalent in substance to the 
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psychological analysis of the price formation mechanism conducted by 
the early marginalists. 
But why retain psychological concepts without psychological content? 
What is the purpose of an analysis which is intended to prop up the 
theory of price and which, apart from small improvements and 
terminological changes, is identical with the old theory? Marginal utility 
theory proper had at least an objective; it purported to be a psychological 
explanation of price formation. The new school tries to salvage the 
hedonistic model by stripping it of its psychological content. Its concepts 
are formal and ‘purely economic’. But its theoretical model is not likely 
to provide a very happy formulation of the specifically psychological 
problem of economics, for in so far as it formulates them at all, it does so 
hedonistically (Myrdal 1930, pp. 99-100).  
As will be seen, this is not exact treatment of the psychological content of 
the theory of the ‘behaviourists’. Myrdal only evokes the idea that, 
notwithstanding its avoidance of the issue of individual motivations, the 
hypothesis of an economic agent able to order his choices on the basis of 
the utility deriving from them reproduces the logic of the utilitarian ethics 
founded on a calculus of pleasure and pain. 
3.2. Circularity of reasoning 
Although Myrdal believed that advances in the other human sciences 
irremediably damaged the claim of utility theory to be a plausible 
explanation of economic action, he did not refrain from further criticisms 
of a certain significance. The circularity in the reasoning of utility theory 
was, according to Myrdal, a defect that principally concerned the 
utilitarians, who on the one hand considered only choices that maximized 
utility to be rational, while on the other – having taken it for granted that 
utility exists – assumed that the individual’s choices maximize net utility 
and consequently concluded that human choices are rational: 
 
Action is said to be a direct consequence of the hedonistic 
calculus only if it is rational. The whole psychological 
theory applies only to the economic man who is defined as 
a man who assesses pleasure and pain effects (note that 
their existence is thereby implied) at their true value and 
who always chooses that line of action which maximizes 
his net pleasure. Now this is the fundamental flaw of the 
hedonistic theory. (...) The theory is claimed to be correct 
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in the sense that anybody who acts in accordance with it, 
acts as the theory claims he does. This is of course circular 
reasoning. (emphasis in the original, 1930, p. 92).            
  
In his excellent work of reconstruction, Palsson Syll 1998 finds singular 
evidence in Myrdal’s 1927 doctoral dissertation, where he seems to claim 
that also the behaviourist version suffered from the defect of being an 
empty tautology. This induces Palsson Syll to conclude that “This only 
shows how firmly based the marginal utility theory is on the utilitarian 
psychological truism that everyone acts as he or she wants” (Palsson Syll 
1998, pp. 415-6). 
Interestingly, in The Political Element the criticism of circular reasoning 
is levelled against both versions of the theory of utility: Myrdal seems to 
have concluded that this, together with the plausibility of the 
psychological explanation, invalidates the core of the neoclassical theory 
of value. In the following quotation, Myrdal unambiguously states that 
the circularity concerns the subjective theory of value as a whole, 
although this is a criticism of not decisive importance: 
 
Even if the objection of circularity were decisive, the 
subjective theory of value could not be dismissed so 
simply. If it is empty, how can it be false? Yet, 
psychologists have maintained, apparently with some 
justification, that it is false. (p. 93). 
 
Nevertheless, in a letter extensively quoted by Palsson Syll (1998, pp. 
416-417) and written to Cassel on 18 January 1930, Myrdal conducts a 
twofold critical assessment. Regarding his project to revise and to 
translate his doctoral dissertation, he writes that the ‘old’ utilitarian 
theory could be criticised for its underlying psychological hypothesis; 
while the ‘new theory of choice’ (Fisher, Pareto and others), unlike the 
first one, could be criticised for circularity of reasoning. Palsson Syll does 
not seem to notice the diversity in the two critical frames, although they 
were almost contemporaneous, given that the date of 31 December 1929 
is appended to the conclusion of the book.12 
                                                 
12 Cassel had supervised Myrdal’s doctoral dissertation. On the reciprocal influence 
between the two men see Myrdal’s afterword to Value in Social Theory, edited by Paul 
Streteen (1958), Palsson Syll 1993 and 1998 (pp. 416-418). 
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Palsson Syll has the merit of reconstructing the evolution of Myrdal’s 
thought on the relationship between economics and psychology (1998, p. 
416 and 421). Should the former rely on the contribution of the latter in 
development of the theory of value; or should it, as Cassel for example 
argued, abstain from that contribution? Note that in 1927 Myrdal was 
closer to Cassel’s position based on Cournot’s explanation of the price 
formation mechanism. He believed in particular that, in explaining prices, 
economics should proceed without drawing on psychology. In the years 
that followed, however, Myrdal seems to have changed his mind and 
admitted, as we shall see in Section 4.1, that economics requires the 
contribution of psychology to explain prices, demand and supply. Such 
investigation should bear in mind that individuals choose (and operate in 
general) within given institutional structures.  
3.3. Continuity of the psychological functions and rationality 
Correlated with the psychological assumptions of utility theory were 
Myrdal’s  criticisms of the continuity between psychological functions 
and rationality. Myrdal considered the assumption of continuity between 
the functions of utility and disutility to be a serious difficulty. He was 
especially dissatisfied with the further implication that the individual 
psychological functions are continuous, because this contradicted the 
empirical results then available to psychologists. Moreover, he criticised 
the practice, in Jevons for example, of aggregating individual 
psychological functions to derive collective ones, considering as 
meaningless the results on which ‘scientific’ policy recommendations 
were then based. 
 
Not only does he assume that motivations of a group of 
persons can be represented analogously to individual 
reactions, but also that the shape of the functions will be the 
same. Economic laws, i.e. propositions about the form of 
these functions, which apply to individuals are supposed to 
apply also to groups. Such assumptions are not even false, 
they are meaningless. (Myrdal 1930, pp. 87-88) 
 
As for rationality, one implication of the marginalists’ position was that 
“economic man is also the ‘average man’, for only then can the theory be 
applied to the world” (1930, p. 95). The corollary to this implication is 
therefore that the normality of human behaviour in the statistical sense is 
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rationality (in the meaning with which the term was used by the theorists 
of utility, i.e. of transitivity). But if this is so, it is necessary to show not 
only that the ‘irrational’ deviations of human behaviour are distributed so 
that they cancel each other out, but also that there is no systematic bias. 
Yet there is no evidence, according to Myrdal, that such proofs are 
forthcoming, nor that psychology in any wise confirms the hypotheses of 
the economists: namely that human behaviours, when observed in a 
sufficiently large amount, have a normal distribution in which the central 
values coincide with the rational behaviours. Rather, the evidence shows 
the opposite, because it has been observed that psychological phenomena 
tend to accumulate and be embedded in a tight network of interrelations: 
 
It is now generally recognised that psychological 
phenomena are interrelated and tend to be cumulative, so 
that it is quite impossible that ‘irrational impulses’ should 
show a normal frequency distribution. We have therefore 
no reason to expect that the average type of behaviour 
would approximate rational behaviour if we aggregate a 
sufficiently large number of cases. (pp. 95-6). 
 
Moreover, in a 1931 writing not translated into English and cited by 
Palsson Syll (1998, p. 422), Myrdal declared that he did not accept the 
dichotomy between the rationality and irrationality of the rationalizations 
that individuals give to their behaviour. It was this dichotomy that 
underpinned the utility approach, but Myrdal dismissed it as scientifically 
meaningless. 
Regarding what we would call with more contemporary terminology 
‘exogeneity of preferences’, I finally quote the appendix to the 1953 
edition by Paul Streeten, which notes that this hypothesis is both 
unrealistic and contradicted by reality, where preferences derive from 
social interrelation: 
 
The recognition that wants and desires are not ultimate, 
independent, autonomous data but the product of social 
relations, also casts doubts on the belief that the more fully 
desires are met by an economic system, the more efficient 
it is. (Streeten 1953, p. 215).  
 
Moreover, in note 12 to the chapter, Streeten points out that the axiomatic 
assumption of the insatiability of preferences is the outcome of 
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competitive economic activity in Western systems which is extraneous to 
numerous non-Western communities, and even to groups internal to the 
competitive systems themselves (Streeten 1953, p. 241) 
Hence, Myrdal’s criticisms of utility theory remained unchanged in their 
force. They  helped economists distance themselves from the instruments 
that they used, which were derived, not from any natural objectivity, but 
from the development of Western and English thought in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
4.1 The influence of the history of ideas and the task of 
economics in The Political Element 
The final chapter of The Political Element conducts detailed examination 
of the role of economics. Although it pertains to a phase of Myrdal’s 
scientific production that he himself (1970) called purely theoretical, it 
adumbrates the developments of his future institutionalist and 
methodological thought. Throughout his lifetime, Myrdal maintained that 
the place of economics was among the moral sciences. Swedberg (p. vii) 
writes that he disagreed with the practice of awarding prizes in 
economics, because it fed the illusion that economics was like biology or 
chemistry, that is, a discipline distinguished by cumulative progress in the 
acquisition of knowledge. For Myrdal, instead, economics was nothing 
other than political economy. At the end of his exploration of the history 
of economic thought, he provided an unequivocal definition of the goals 
of economic science: 
 
to keep political arguments rational, that it to say to base 
them on as complete and correct a knowledge of the facts 
as possible. (p. 206). 
 
This is a definition that differs profoundly from that furnished shortly 
thereafter by Robbins (1932) when he systematized the stock of ideas 
shared by the economists in his Essays on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science. Robbins’ celebrated definition of the properly 
economic aspect of human behaviour – the relationship between ends and 
scarce means applicable to alternative uses – implied a conception of 
economic science as a deductive science which proceeds by logical 
deduction from given postulates. The initial hypothesis was that 
economic agents are homologous in their preferences. In regard to the 
problem of utility, consumer theory started from the simple and obvious 
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idea (which became an admissible postulate) that individuals order their 
preferences according to the utility deriving from them. Myrdal’s critique 
instead centred on the admissibility of this postulate. 
Myrdal’s close examination of the Benthamite heritage in economic 
theory induced him to regard the notion of the harmony of interests 
within an economic system as arbitrary, or at least “not necessary”, and to 
develop a different view based on the conviction that  
 
The whole theory of value is intended not only as an 
explanation of economic activity but as the basis for a 
welfare economics, for a theory of social value (p. 194). 
 
The basic idea is that the economy is pervaded by the notion of the 
harmony of interests as well expressed by the idea that economic activity 
can be likened to ‘housekeeping’ by an individual social actor. But what, 
according Myrdal, was the influence of the history of ideas on the thought 
of economists? 
Myrdal based his analysis of the ideological element permeating 
economic theory on the birth of economics as a science, which occurred 
within moral philosophy and in a cultural environment permeated by the 
philosophy of natural law. The newborn science subsequently developed 
under the powerful influence of utilitarian philosophy. Myrdal patiently 
traces the deposit left in the method and fundamental concepts of 
economics by these two philosophical doctrines, which, in his view, 
surprisingly pushed in the same direction.  
The theory of natural law first exerted its influence through physiocracy 
(Myrdal 1930, pp. 26-32). In the history of economic science the 
physiocrats were the first to study an economic order conceived as an 
unified whole, and within which all economic phenomena found coherent 
systematization. Their study of the ordre naturel evinced the extent to 
which the forma mentis of the physiocrats had been shaped by the 
philosophy of natural law, the distinctive feature of which was its 
identification of the real with the rational. On this formulation, the moral 
law did not derive its legitimacy from a natural order of things; rather, the 
natural order had legitimacy in and of itself. The physiocrats 
distinguished between natural order and positive order, but they believed 
that the former comprised a body of unchangeable and universal rules, 
immediately evident because of their intrinsic rationality, which governed 
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the latter. For example, the doctrine of laissez faire was at once a 
scientific law and a political postulate.  
The British culture in which empiricism developed was pervaded by the 
influence of utilitarianism, which had absorbed Hobbes’ doctrine of the 
‘psychological’ hedonist foundation of social ethics and was sceptical of 
any attempt to give such ethics a metaphysical basis. The view of the 
early British economists was that every norm of behaviour should be 
evaluated on the basis of its observable results, which could be 
objectively distinguished into good and bad. Common interest – defined 
as the sum of the satisfactions of single individuals – was the 
result/foundation of this practical ethics.  
The assumption behind this definition was the harmony of interests. This 
was a functional assumption made, according to Myrdal, in order to 
circumvent two problems: on the one hand calculating the individual 
quantities of individual benefit (if the interest of each is the interest of all, 
there is no need to calculate it quantitatively); on the other, proving the 
coincidence of the morality of action with the ‘normality’ of economic 
action maximizing individual interest (otherwise there inevitably arises 
the contradiction that acting morally entails acting against one’s own 
interests) (1930, pp. 44-45).13 Subsequent debate in British moral 
philosophy was almost impermeable to continental influences. Its features 
consolidated further, and they powerfully informed economics, not so 
much in relation to content as to method: that is, in relation to the theory 
of value (which, as argued in Section 3.1, derived from the assumption 
that individuals choose rationally, maximizing their net utility) and 
harmony of interests in the economic system. Indeed, Myrdal was 
convinced that economic doctrines are the most coherent formulation and 
application of the social ethics of utilitarianism. 
 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to note that L. J. Hume (1969) examines Myrdal’s interpretation of 
Jeremy Bentham’s thought and does not find sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis 
that utilitarian ethics had transmitted the notion of a natural harmony of  interests to 
economists, thereby decisively shaping the doctrine of laissez-faire. Hume also suggests 
that Myrdal’s contention that the natural harmony assumption was necessary for Bentham 
to preserve the inner consistency of his ethical theory contained “a great deal of 
interpretation” (p. 296).  This line of argument requires a demonstration that the 
assumption of harmony was both necessary and sufficient to complete the argument to the 
explicit conclusion, or that to have denied it would have contradicted some other part of 
the argument. (Hume 1969, p. 296).  Which Myrdal had evidently failed to do. 
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Against this inherited body of thought Myrdal took up a position drawn 
from analysis of the classical economists and which assumed that 
interests within a economic system are not homogeneous. And in any 
case, if the natural harmony of interests exists, according to Myrdal, it 
should not be assumed, conveniently concealed in ‘scientific’ concepts, 
and considered in its consequences. On the contrary, it should be 
identified and tested in the various economic cases considered (inflation, 
introduction of trade restrictions, participation in exchange-rate 
agreements, etc.). Myrdal maintained that, in the majority of cases, 
economic activity involved a conflict of interests, and that economic 
theory should expressly consider those interests: 
 
Instead of answering the question how, in given conditions, 
prices, incomes, and other quantities are determined, the 
theory ought to be able to answer the question of what 
interferences, if any, would be in the interests of what 
group. (1930, p. 196). 
 
Accordingly, reconstruction of interests was indispensable for analysis of 
economic problems. This task, however, was anything but 
straightforward. It first required consideration of the institutional 
structure, as represented not only by the legal system but also by the 
customs, habits, and conventions sanctioned or tolerated by law. There 
was no reason to assume this structure as given, although this was the 
standard practice in economic theory. In fact, if a change in an economic 
variable altered the interests of groups with sufficient political power to 
induce an institutional change, then all the institutional factors (the tax 
regime, the social legislation, the degree of market openness, etc.) 
configuring a market could be modified. For this reason, the social 
structure should be considered an analytical variable highly sensitive to 
shifts of power among social groups, not as a constant initial parameter. 
But this is only the first problem raised by Myrdal. The recognition of 
interests is complicated when one considers that the interests that drive 
individuals and groups are not solely economic: 
 
Unfortunately – or perhaps fortunately – human actions are 
not solely motivated by economic interests. The concept 
itself, though popular among economists, presents on closer 
introspection, certain difficulties. Presumably ‘economic 
interest’ means the desire for higher incomes and lower 
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prices and, in addition, perhaps stability of earnings and 
employment, reasonable time for leisure and environment 
conducive to its satisfactory use, good working conditions, 
etc. But even with all these qualifications, political 
aspirations cannot be identified with those interests. People 
are also interested in social objectives. They believe in 
ideals to which they want their society to conform. (p. 199) 
 
Myrdal cited examples from history is support of his thesis. The workers’ 
struggles at the time of the industrial revolution cannot be explained 
solely in terms of demands for greater social security and higher wages: 
conditions had been little better for the previous rural generations, who 
had suffered them as natural aspects of life in patriarchal societies. The 
workers of the newly-industrialized cities of the nineteenth-century only 
began to demand better living standards when the French Revolution’s 
ideas of justice and legality made them aware of injustice. Therefore, 
according to Myrdal (1930, p. 200), it was the feeling of being oppressed 
that was the important factor. Myrdal’s analysis of interests is 
complicated further by his introduction of social attitudes, defined as 
“emotional dispositions of an individual or to group to respond in certain 
ways to actual or potential situations” (p. 200). 
How can such diversified interests be identified within society? Myrdal 
argues that one cannot trust the declarations of individuals. Here Myrdal 
draws on psychology. As seen in Section 3.2, clearly apparent in The 
Political Element is the conviction that : 
 
economics requires as its foundation a psychological 
explanation of the causes of supply, demand, and price. It is 
probable that the most future important advances will be 
made in this direction. (p. 100). 
 
Consistently with the critique examined thus far, Myrdal was convinced 
that the contribution of psychology should be entirely different from that 
of utilitarianism in all its versions. And, on the basis of developments in 
psychology, in order to interpret the results of statistical surveys, he 
argued that the concepts of ‘desire’ and ‘sacrifice’ had to be replaced by 
those of ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’:  
But such psychological inquiries must be of a very different type from 
those of hedonism and subjective value theory (including the behaviourist 
interpretation). Much can be learned from statistical inquiries, although 
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they must, in the first place, be interpreted in terms of ‘stimulus’ and 
‘response’, not ‘want’ and ‘sacrifice’. (...) Social psychology and 
sociology may yield dark even rewarding results. (1930, p. 100).   
Myrdal gave social psychology the task of analysing the empirically 
observable attitudes of social groups pursuing different economic 
interests. Such analysis should also take account of potential social 
attitudes: those, that is, which may be activated in specific conditions. He 
stressed, in fact, that a logical hierarchy in the evaluation of individual 
preferences does not exist. There is no logical hierarchy of preferences 
dominated by fundamental axioms (p. 203), and the scientist that argues 
for its existence only does so as the result of a process of rationalization. 
Psychology had already demonstrated that rationalization on its own 
determines neither individual behaviours nor social attitudes. On this 
view, which clearly advocated the interdisciplinary analysis of economic 
phenomena, Myrdal was aware of what economic theory was at risk of 
losing: the formal elegance of the notion of general economic 
equilibrium: 
 
It will probably prove impossible to arrive at an elegant, 
logically coherent, psychological system, similar to that of 
subjective value theory. Particularly now, when 
psychologists are divided into numerous schools and are 
highly specialized, it seems hardly possible that formal 
coherence should ever be achieved. (1930, p. 100). 
 
At this point, having shown that examination of the social attitudes is the 
prerequisite for the analyses of political economy, Myrdal again, and 
finally, complicates his argument: neither are social attitudes 
unmodifiable analytical givens. This is a complication of secondary 
importance before modernity, because once social attitudes had been 
formed in the past, they changed only gradually; but it was a 
complication of maximum importance at a time of advances in 
communications and techniques of psychological conditioning: especially 
the political propaganda and advertising techniques able to shape the 
minds of the younger generation and the opinions of adults. Myrdal cites 
not only the cases of the Italian and Soviet dictatorial regimes, but also 
the indoctrination practised at the time by the media in the United States.  
What was the antidote to this powerful conditioning of social attitudes? 
Certainly, Myrdal warns, it is not the task of economics either to shape 
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social interests or to establish those that are “recommendable”. Rather, 
education and training in the social sciences were the most effective 
means with which to combat such forms of collective manipulation. Only 
if economists were modest in their claims and abandoned their endeavour 
to postulate universal norms could they help rationalize the arguments put 
forward in political discussion and back them with knowledge of the facts 
which was as complete and correct as possible – this being the prime 
practical objective of political economy.    
5.1. Concluding remarks 
This paper has shown that Myrdal subjected the theory of utility to a 
comprehensive critique whose main components have been described. 
First discussed was his distinction of the neoclassical authors into 
utilitarians and behaviourists; a distinction less known in the debate on 
utility than that between cardinalists and ordinalists. It is an interesting 
distinction because it marks a crucial stage in the evolution of the theory 
which, from Fisher onwards, concentrated on observable choices and 
emptied of psychological content a theory that relied on its subjective 
nature.  
The paper has shown the argument that Myrdal deemed crucial and which 
contested the plausibility of the interpretation of human behaviour 
subsumed by the neoclassical theory of value in both its versions: namely 
that individuals act to maximize their net utility. This hypothesis on 
human behaviour was confuted by the advances in psychology available 
to the social scientists of the time. It has also been shown that Myrdal, 
through patient conceptual analysis of the theoretical economic notions 
inherited by the economists of the 1920s, argued that this interpretation 
derived from the doctrines of utilitarianism and natural law which 
permeated how “we think in economic terms”. It was therefore not 
aseptic and ‘scientific’, but rather the product of the evolution of Western 
thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
Concurrent with this criticism of utility are others: the inadmissibility of 
the dichotomy between the irrationality and rationality of human 
behaviour; and the logical criticism that the hypothesis of continuity 
among the psychological functions is groundless. In particular, discussion 
of the logical critique has demonstrated the meticulousness with which 
Myrdal identified the shifts of discourse that allowed  normative 
propositions to be juxtaposed with positive ones. In this way it has been 
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possible to counter criticisms like that of Blaug (1980) examined in 
Section 2.1. We have seen that all together these arguments, though acute 
and apposite, were not considered decisive by Myrdal in confuting the 
theory of utility, given that the decisive factor in its refutation was 
scientific unreliability in psychological terms. These arguments have 
been recently resumed in criticisms against utility by behavioural 
economists. 
It has also been observed that, already at the time of his purely theoretical 
reflections, Myrdal had developed a view of economic science different 
from those that found first axiomatic codification in Robbins (1932). 
Contrary to the hypothesis that agents have uniform preferences, Myrdal 
advanced a view centred on conflicts of interests among social groups. In 
regard to the notion of economics as a deductive science that proceeds 
rigorously from certain postulates admissible because of their intrinsic 
evidence, Myrdal’s approach was open to interdisciplinary comparison. 
Indeed, he believed that economic science, whose purpose was the 
rationalization of arguments on political choices, had to be founded on 
psychology and on social psychology. This approach presaged what 
would become a cornerstone of Myrdal’s discourse on the method of 
social research: namely that there is no merely economic point of view in 
the analysis of problems.  
An interesting point that should be explored further, and which has not 
been examined here, it is the apparent contradiction in Myrdal’s critique 
against the utilitarian and behaviouralist versions of the theory of utility: 
in The Political Element Myrdal evidently believes that circularity of 
reasoning and the inadmissibility of the hypothesis on the human 
behaviour are criticisms that apply equally to the two versions. In a 
practically contemporaneous letter to Cassel, he wrote instead that the 
utilitarians could be criticised for the inadmissibility of their hypothesis 
on human behaviour and the behaviouralists for the circularity of their 
reasoning. Clarification of this distinction could be a fruitful development 
in the future historical reconstruction of Myrdal’s thought. 
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